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Many books criticise Quine’s work on semantics, but few do so without forswearing, at least 
tacitly or unwittingly, Quine’s most basic philosophical commitments.  Becker’s is not such a 
book.  He aims to contribute positively to a programme that is recognisably Quinean in letter 
and spirit.  Quine’s main ambition is to make naturalistic and indeed scientific sense of the 
whole of human knowledge, despite the impediments represented by his famous negative 
conclusions; and those negative conclusions—that translation is indeterminate, that reference 
is inscrutable, that analyticity and meaning prove to crumble on closer examination—are not 
reached for want of trying to establish their opposites. Becker tries to do better, and perhaps 
succeeds.     
Among the aforementioned philosophical commitments is Quine’s behaviourism.  
Becker is very explicit on what Quinean behaviourism comes to, and is meticulous in 
checking that nothing he argues for strays outside its confines.  Quine’s behaviourism is not 
that the meaning of a sentence or term can be identified with corresponding behaviour, nor 
that semantic expressions themselves reduce to behaviour.  It’s that ‘the only facts relevant to 
translation are behavioural facts’ (p. 128); later Becker expands, calling it a supervenience 
thesis—that there are ‘no differences in meaning, synonymy, analyticity, etc.—without 
differences in behaviour or behavioural dispositions’ (p. 233-4).   His task then is to restore, 
on thoroughly Quinean ground, the determinacy of translation, the scrutability of reference, 
the objectivity of analyticity and synonymy, and even the conventionality of logic; he thereby 
clears the way for more straightforward and intuitive epistemological doctrines than Quine’s 
own. 
This comes in the final chapter of the book. The first four chapters—taking up 229 of 
304 pages—are devoted to painstaking exegeses of the famous semantic doctrines: anti-
conventionalism (Ch. 1), that the objectivity or at least the epistemic significance of 
analyticity and synonymy is insupportable (Ch. 2), the indeterminacy of translation (Ch. 3), 
ontological relativity and (or?) the inscrutability of reference (Ch. 4). Although I was very 
sympathetic to the substance of what Becker says here—my complaints never rose above 
quibbles—I thought some of this too scholarly, especially in comparison with the non-
scholarly Chapter 5.  Not about the style—Becker’s writing is exemplary—but about its 
point.  To take the most visible example, much of Chapter 4—seventy-three pages—is 
devoted to trying to make sense of ‘Ontological Relativity’, an extraordinary essay which, 
however, a few years after it was written, Quine himself conceded was confused.  I could not 
see why Becker could not have some space by reporting the wiser, simpler, and one could say 
more bracing account of the issue of the relevant sections of the later The Roots of Reference,  
Pursuit of Truth, or From Stimulus to Science, or the various later  essays such as ‘Things and 
Their Place in Theories’.  Still, the first four chapters contain various helpful exegetical or 
reconstructive things, including: the precise target of ‘Truth by Convention’ (pp. 7-13); the 
question-begging and circularity objections to conventionalism (pp. 42-4); stimulus meaning 
vs. intuitive meaning (pp. 101-2) and intersubjective vs. intrasubjective stimulus meaning (p. 
105); the distinction between intralinguistic (possible) vs. interlinguistic (not possible) 
explications of synonymy and analyticity (pp. 117-21 (what has been called immanent vs. 
transcendental conceptions, helpfully connecting the matter with analogous phenomena 
regarding truth); the exact relations between physicalism, indeterminacy of translation, and 
behaviourism (p. 128-34); the argument for indeterminacy that presses from below (pp. 140-
4) and that which presses from above (pp. 147-53).  Of course these topics have been visited 
over and again in the literature, but new and worthwhile points do issue from Becker’s pen. 
Then some quibbles: for a book that puts so much effort into scholarly matters, I 
would have liked more of Quine relationship to Carnap, especially when Carnap described 
things similar to the sort of thing advocated in Chapter 5; despite Quine’s endorsing the term, 
I think verificationism a poor choice for conveying Quine’s view of language (pp. xi, 89-90, 
107, 267, 277);  a slight lack of clarity on the crucial distinction between inscrutability 
arguments and full-blown indeterminacy arguments: the former leaves the truth-values of all 
sentences unscathed, whereas the latter, at least in earlier formulations, leaves open the 
possibility that one correct translation of a sentence could be the negation of another, equally 
correct translation of the same sentence; the important introduction of observation 
categoricals and reification (in the Roots of Reference) is underplayed (pp. 145-6 fn. 37); the 
later discussions of the underdetermination of theory by evidence in which Quine settles for 
incompatibility of competing theories’ being practical rather than logical are not mentioned 
(see Pursuit of Truth);  observation sentences could have been more satisfyingly 
distinguished from standing sentences by first distinguishing them as a sub-class of occasion 
sentences, namely those such that dispositions to assent to them vary with present 
stimulation, whereas dispositions to assent to occasion sentences such as ‘interest rates are 
rising’ do vary but not systematically according to present stimulation (p. 96f); little is made 
of an important problem that bedevilled Quine for over thirty years from shortly after the 
appearance of Word and Object, namely how to reconcile the proximity of stimulations with 
the demand that language and in particular observation sentences be social (Becker mentions 
it on p. 103-4, but only in a footnote—personally I think Quine thinks he succeeded in the 
reconciliation, and did not, as according to Becker, simply give in to Davidson in ‘Progress 
on Two Fronts’); this I’m sure is a slip, but Becker sometimes characterises terms as 
‘untranslatable’ or similar (p. 164, 270, 274) when he surely means ‘not uniquely 
translatable’, thereby encouraging certain misunderstandings; I don’t think Quine ever 
commits to saying ‘it is nonsense to ask after the references of our terms’ (p. 173, my 
emphasis); Becker perhaps misplays Quine’s invocation of the Tarski intralinguistic 
paradigm concerning reference (“‘rabbits” refers to rabbits’ etc.)—it is a ‘light’, immanent 
notion, does not provide an anchor of words to things, and accepting it stops the regress; it’s 
not as if one has magical powers over one’s own words (pp. 218-24, but p. 225 where Becker 
gets it right).   
In Chapter 5 Becker shifts gears, from synopsis and exegesis to criticism and 
construction. Let me say that this chapter alone makes the book; its structure is tight, the 
writing is lively, and the points cogent and wide of scope. Becker again disposes of the 
common complaint that Quine is a simple behaviourist in the manner of Skinner (see above—
although, harmlessly, Becker repeats the mistaken idea that Quine thought of assent and 
dissent as intentional notions, saying ‘sentences in which we speak of them contain contexts 
that are not subject to substitutivity of identity’ p. 234; no, they are just more behaviour—see 
p. 252 of Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist, Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press 2008).  Then he explains how one could, working within Quine behaviourism,  solve 
the ‘Gavagai’ problem).  I can’t convey much of this discussion here, but a major point is that 
Becker thinks that, contrary to Quine, ‘Gavagai’ (or ‘Rabbit’) is not stimulus synonymous 
with both ‘A rabbit is there’ and ‘That’s a rabbit’ (pp. 235-6); the latter, unlike the former, 
requires a visible rabbit.  And closer attention to what goes on when we point out an object, 
and when we observe that cooperation from the subjects can rightly be demanded, disqualify 
many of Quine’s weird translations such as ‘Undetached rabbit-part’.   
The really crucial part of the discussion is when Becker responds to what Quine 
regarded as knock-down argument for the inscrutability of reference, that by proxy-
functions—1-1 mappings of the range of the reference relation. The challenge is to find a way 
of distinguishing between reference schemes that make true all and only the same sentences.  
Suppose R is an empirically adequate reference scheme and R* takes as its range the proxies 
of R-referents (so that for example ‘Spot is a dog’ is transformed into ‘The proxy of Spot is 
the proxy of a dog’).  Then a sentence of R* will have same truth-value as the corresponding 
sentence of R, but will be about the proxies.  Becker proposes that we can add to the 
requirements on translation that translation should involve a ‘part-by-part’ matching of words 
(pp. 258-9).  For my part I’m not persuaded.  Consider the proxy-function ‘x is a cosmic 
complement of y’.  Suppose aliens spoke a language with simple terms for cosmic 
complements.  But, unsuspecting, we translate them as talking about rabbits etc.  Would we 
be making a mistake?  Or is the supposition somehow impossible?  Or is the distinction it 
involves unreal?  I’m not sure what Becker would say.  It’s hard to see his added constraint as 
being more that a purely formal one on translational practice, and that much does not answer 
the question of the constraint’s empirical justification, or bring to light a previously 
overlooked behavioural difference in reference schemes that are proxy-equivalent.  And even 
if we grant it, it remains a ‘light’ constraint—it doesn’t pin down reference as a substantive 
word-thing relation. 
Becker has another important idea for the translation of theoretical predicates, which 
as I said will remind one of Carnap: a description  is a -description for a speaker iff he 
would assent to “if something were  then it would be ” (p. 263). In other words: we ask 
the native not for the extensions of predicates but for the links between them.  Again, it’s 
promising but one worries that non-semantical matters of fact will creep in, and also that one 
is asking the subject for his opinion of a subjunctive conditional, therefore requiring that that 
sophisticated form of words first be translated; indeed that one is relying semantic necessity 
in setting the test.  With the crucial addition of these and some other points, Becker argues in 
closing that a Davidsonian programme delivers analyticity, the determinacy of translation and 
reference, and, since (roughly), if the translation of P is a logical truth then ‘P’ is true in L 
will be derivable in an empirical theory (pp, 290-1) it is ‘true by language’ in a 
straightforward way; they are also conventional (borrowing the ideas of David Lewis in 
spelling out the sense of ‘conventional’).   
I was disappointed not to see words about extensionalism, and about truth—especially 
as Tarski is implicitly imported with Davidson; both are so vital to things Quinean. I was also 
sorry to see a book about Quine not mentioning the formidable book by Peter Hylton, Quine 
(Routledge, 2009). Errata: p. 110 read the second and fourth occurrences of ‘’ as (say) ‘’;  
p. 150 read ‘intension’ for ‘intention’; p. 302 read ‘nor’ for ‘not’.  
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